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JURISDICTION OVER THE CANADIAN
OFFSHORE: A SEA OF CONFUSION
By ROWLAND J. HARRISON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia,' the Supreme Court
of Canada handed down a joint opinion that Canada, rather than British
Columbia, had jurisdiction in relation to the mineral and other natural re-
sources of the sea bed and subsoil off the coast of the Province.2 The then
Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, later referred to the opinion as "an
authoritative clarification of the legal position .... on the basis of principles
that would appear to be substantially applicable to the east coast as well as to
the west coast .... ,,3 However, the issue of jurisdiction over offshore areas
was not resolved as finally and universally as the Prime Minister's statement
might imply. Indeed, the Prime Minister himself recognized the practical diffi-
culties involved in ascertaining which specific areas would be federal and
which provincial on the basis of the Court's reference to the sea bed and sub-
soil seaward from the low-water mark "outside the harbours, bays, estuaries
and other similar inland waters .... -4 Furthermore, the east coast Provinces
0 Copyright, 1979, R. J. Harrison.
* Executive Director, Canadian Institute of Resources Law and Professor of Law,
University of Calgary.
1 [1967] S.C.R. 792, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353.
2 The particular questions asked of the Court, and the answers given, are discussed
further in the text accompanying notes 62-68 and note 128, infra.
3 Statement of the Prime Minister to the House of Commons on Offshore Mineral
Rights in Can. H. of C. Deb. Dec. 2, 1968, at 3342, reproduced in Lewis and Thompson,
Canadian Oil and Gas (Toronto: Butterworths, continuing) Vol. 1, § 29B.
4 Question referred to the Court in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note
1, at 796 (S.C.R.), 356 (D.L.R.).
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have repeatedly argued that the very principles of the Court's opinion would
lead to different conclusions if applied to their different histories. This has
been particularly true of Newfoundland which, as well as denying the correct-
ness of Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, has publicly relied on
its former status as a sovereign dominion as a basis for insisting that the ratio
in that case would yield a different result with respect to Newfoundland than
it did when applied to British Columbia.a
The Supreme Court's opinion may well have determined the issue ofjurisdiction over offshore areas between Canada and British Columbia, but it
is arguable that it did not provide a framework of understanding that would
enable one to apply the judgment reliably to other situations. Indeed, in light
of the reasoning in several judgments in a series of recent decisions of the
High Court of Australia, as much confusion persists as ever. The Australian
decisions serve to highlight several deficiencies in the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Canada in its opinion. The reasoning of the majority in the Australian
cases supports the conclusion of Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Co-
lumbia, and some of the judgments specifically approve of the result in that
Reference and adopt its reasoning. However, the latter judgments seem to
labour under the same difficulties that are identifiable in the Supreme Court's
reasoning, and thus do little to resolve matters convincingly.
Furthermore, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in Re Strait of
Georgia,0 had difficulty in agreeing on what was decided with respect to four
particular straits in the Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia deci-
sion. The Court of Appeal divided three to two in holding that lands covered
by the waters of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the Strait of Georgia, Johnstone
Strait, and Queen Charlotte Strait were the property of British Columbia.
In brief, there are several problems that arise from the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia.7
5 See Martin, Newfoundland's Case on Offshore Minerals: A Brief Outline (1975),
7 Ottawa L. Rev. 34; Peckford, Minister of Mines and Energy, Government of New-
foundland & Labrador, Heritage of the Sea ... Our Case on Offshore Mineral Rights,
undated.
0(1977), 1 B.C.L.R. 97.
7 Several articles have examined the Supreme Court's opinion and some have pointed
to the problems in the Court's reasoning, but none has examined the implications of all
of the Australian decisions. See, for example, Head, The Canadian Offshore Minerals
Reference (1968), 18 U. Toronto L.J. 131, and Ballem, "Oil and Gas and the Canadian
Constitution on Land and Under the Sea," in L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 1978, The Consti-
tution (Toronto: de Boo, 1978) 251. Ballem, op. cit. at 270, concludes that "The question
of ownership and jurisdiction of offshore resources in Canadian territorial waters is still
unsettled" and, further, that "Owing to the different and sometimes unique historical
development of the Canadian provinces from their colonial days, it is doubtful if this
matter will be finally determined until each province has had its day in court." Swan, The
Newfoundland Offshore Claims: Interface of Constitutional Federalism and International
Law (1976), 22 McGill L.J. 541, discusses the Seas and Submerged Lands case, infra note
12, but concentrates on distinguishing the position of Newfoundland rather than on ex-
amining the implications of the Australian case for the validity of the reasoning of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C.
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This article will attempt to identify them and to clarify the issues involved
in each.
Until recently, it appeared that the Supreme Court would be faced with
a re-examination of Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia in the
near future. In 1977, the federal government agreed on a scheme of joint ad-
ministration of offshore mineral resources with Nova Scotia, New Brunswick
and Prince Edward Island. This agreement effectively put aside the question
of jurisdiction as far as these three provinces were concerned. Indeed, it was
an underlying premise of the agreement that resolution of the question would
be avoided and, thus, the application of Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British
Columbia to these provinces was thereafter of largely theoretical interest.
Newfoundland, however, found that agreement unacceptable and declared
that it would proceed with the preparation of a reference to the Supreme
Court of Canada to have the matter of jurisdiction resolved as between it and
the federal government. In the course of that reference, the Court would have
been called upon to re-examine its 1967 opinion.
In September, 1979, the new federal government of Prime Minister Joe
Clark announced that it would grant full jurisdiction over offshore resources
to the coastal provinces. That announcement might make it appear that juris-
diction is no longer an issue and, therefore, that any alleged problems in the
Supreme Court's view of the matter in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British
Columbia are of no consequence.
While this development does mean, no doubt, that the Newfoundland
reference will not proceed, and that the Supreme Court will not, therefore,
be called upon to deal with the issue in the immediate future, it is premature
to relegate the 1967 opinion to the realm of mere historical interest. What the
constitution in fact says about jurisdiction over offshore areas continues to be
pertinent for three primary, interrelated reasons. First, no agreement between
governments in Canada can amend the constitution and, hence, constitutional
jurisdiction over offshore areas will remain wherever it is now, in the absence
of formal constitutional amendment. Second, the method of implementing any
grant of jurisdiction will depend, fundamentally and critically, upon where
that jurisdiction in fact resides. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore
this problem further but, for the purpose of emphasizing its significance, one
need only ask the following question: How could the federal government grant
full jurisdiction over offshore mineral resources to, say, Newfoundland if it
should be the position under the existing constitution that Newfoundland al-
ready has that jurisdiction? Third, there is always the possibility that a con-
stitutional issue could be precipitated for resolution by the courts by actions
beyond the control of even the combined efforts of the federal and provincial
governments. Thus, an oil company holding oil and gas exploitation rights
from the federal government might challenge the constitutional validity of any
federal attempt to hand over jurisdiction to the provinces in a manner that in-
fringed upon those rights. If it did so, the courts, of course, would have to re-
solve the issue exclusively on the basis of what the existing constitution says
and not on the basis of any agreement between the federal government and
any, or for that matter all, of the provinces. The more lenient attitude that
has emerged in the courts in recent years with respect to granting standing to
1979]
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individual citizens increases the chances that the issue might eventually wend
its way to a judicial resolution. 8
For all of these reasons, the validity of the opinion of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, and the rea-
sons for that opinion, continue to be of real interest.
H. RE OFFSHORE MINERAL RIGHTS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
In Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, the Supreme Court
was asked five questions. The first three related to lands under the territorial
sea seaward from the ordinary low-water mark on the coast, outside the har-
bours, bays, estuaries and other similar inland waters.
The Court was asked whether these lands were the property of Canada or
British Columbia. Did Canada or British Columbia have the right to explore
and exploit the lands? Did Canada or British Columbia have legislative juris-
diction over the lands?
The last two questions related to the mineral and other natural resources
of the sea bed beyond the territorial sea, i.e., the resources of the continental
shelf. Did Canada or British Columbia have the right to explore and exploit
these resources? Did Canada or British Columbia have legislative jurisdiction
in relation to these resources?
The answer to all five questions was "Canada." Thus, as between British
Columbia and Canada, the latter had exclusive jurisdiction over the mineral
resources of both the territorial sea and the continental shelf beyond.
Briefly, the Court's reasons were that, at common law, the jurisdiction of
England and her territories ended at the low-water mark. Although the realm
might be extended to include the territorial sea, such extension would require
a positive exercise of jurisdiction by legislation. In the case of British Colum-
bia, there had been no such legislative extension of the limits of the Province
at the time of its entry into Confederation and, therefore, the boundary
ended at the low-water mark of the Pacific Ocean. In other words,.the lands
under the territorial sea were outside the Province and, for that reason, beyond
its proprietorship and legislative jurisdiction.
As far as the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea was concerned,
the Court held that British Columbia had no jurisdiction because the legislative
jurisdiction of the provinces is limited by The British North America Act to
matters "in each Province." The boundary of British Columbia having been
8 See further Mullan, Standing After McNeil (1976), 8 Ottawa L. Rev. 32 at 49,
where he poses the question:
More interesting perhaps and certainly more difficult will be the case in which a
private citizen, say of Newfoundland, seeks, for example, to challenge the federal
government's statutory regulation of offshore mineral rights off the Newfoundland
coast. Is this a justiciable constitutional dispute? Do private citizens have a "real
stake" in its resolution? Would "grave inconvenience" result from the interference
that such litigation would cause to ongoing inter-governmental negotiations?
9 The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 92.
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fixed at the low-water mark by the Court's answers to the questions concern-
ing the lands under the territorial sea, it followed that the Province could not
have jurisdiction over the continental shelf.
The Court added that the right to legislate in relation to the resources of
the continental shelf was a right acquired in international law. As Canada, and
not the provinces, was the only unit of the federal system recognized in inter-
national law, these rights must belong to it.
III. THE CONTROVERSIAL AUTHORITY OF R. v. KEYN
Central to the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offshore
Mineral Rights of British Columbia was acceptance of the majority opinion in
R. v. Keyn 10 as authority for the proposition that, at common law, the territory
of the realm ends at the low-water mark." That view of Keyn has also been
accepted by a majority of the High- Court of Australia in the recent series of
cases dealing with jurisdiction over offshore areas, most authoritatively in
New South Wales v. Commonwealth (the Seas and Submerged Lands case).12
In the Seas and Submerged Lands case, however, there were three powerful
dissents from the prevailing view of Keyn that argued most persuasively that
there is later authority in the Privy Council for a directly contrary view of
Keyn. Rarely is one confronted with a case so shrouded in controversy re-
garding exactly what it decided.' 3
R. v. Keyn 14 arose from a collision between two ships within three miles
of the English coast off Dover, resulting in loss of life. The accused, a German
national, was in command of the Franconia, which was merely passing through
these waters en route to a foreign port. He was indicted for manslaughter
before the Central Criminal Court where he set up a plea of jurisdiction, argu-
ing that the English Criminal Courts had no jurisdiction over an offence com-
mitted out of the United Kingdom by a foreigner on board a foreign ship. In
Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada saw the case as being quite straightforward:
The English Criminal Courts would have had jurisdiction if the act had occurred
within the body of a county of England. The question whether the territorial sea
was within the body of the county was, therefore, directly in issue. If it had been
within the body of the county, the Court of Oyer and Terminer would have had
jurisdiction. The majority decision of the Court was that the territory of England
10 (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63.
11 Supra note 1, at 802-07 (S.C.R.), 363-66 (D.L.R.).
12 (1975), 135 C.L.R. 337, 8 A.L.R. 1. For a general analysis of the decision, see
Goldsworthy, Ownership of the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf of Australia: An
Analysis of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act Case (1976), 50 Aust. L.J. 175.
"3 No less than 13 judges participated, with the final decision being given by a majority
of 7 to 6. The words of Buckley L.J. in Tehidy Minerals v. Norman, [1971] 2 Q.B. 528 at
547, [1971] 2 All E.R. 475 at 487 (C.A.), speaking of Angus v. Dalton (1877), 3 Q.B.D.
85, might as well have been spoken of the Keyn case; "This celebrated case, which in the
course of its history enjoyed the attention of no less than 18 judges and members of the
House of Lords, perhaps embodies a greater variety of judicial opinion than any other
leading case."
14 Supra note 10.
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ends at low-water mark. There was, therefore, no jurisdiction in the Court of Oyer
and Terminer. 15
In the Supreme Court's opinion, the case had decided that the territory of
England and the sovereignty of the Crown stopped at low-water mark, except
where, under special circumstances and in special acts, Parliament had thought
fit to extend it.16 A similar view of the decision has been expressed variously
in the High Court of Australia in Bonser v. LaMacchia,17 R. v. Bull1 8 and the
Seas and Submerged Lands case. 19
The Seas and Submerged Lands case is the Australian counterpart to
Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia. It arose from the enactment
by the Commonwealth Parliament of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act
1973,20 which declares that sovereignty in respect of the territorial sea and in-
ternal waters21 of Australia, the airspace over those waters, and the bed and
subsoil thereof is vested in and exercisable by the Crown in right of the Com-
monwealth.-2 Similarly, the Act declares that the sovereign rights of Australia
in respect of the continental shelf, for the purpose of exploring it and exploit-
ing its natural resources, are also vested in the Commonwealth Crown.2'
The High Court of Australia held unanimously that the Act was valid
with respect to the continental shelf and, by a majority of five to two, that it
was also valid with respect to the territorial sea and internal waters. The ma-
jority held that the Act was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's jurisdic-
tion with respect to "external affairs." 24 The States, as former Imperial Colo-
nies, ended at the low-water mark and had no sovereign or proprietary rights
in respect of the territorial sea or the continental shelf.
There is no class of subject entitled "external affairs" under The British
North America Act,2 5 but it is immediately apparent that the reasoning that
led the Australian Court to the conclusion that the Seas and Submerged Lands
Act 1973 was legislation with respect to external affairs is strikingly similar to
the reasoning that led the Supreme Court of Canada to its conclusion that
jurisdiction over submerged lands off British Columbia was federal because
15 Supra note 1, at 804 (S.C.R.), 363 (D.L.R.).
1 Id. at 806 (S.C.R.), 366 (D.L.R.).
'7 (1969), 122 C.L.R. 177, [1969] A.L.R. 741 at 184 (C.L.R.), 744 (A.L.R.) per
Barwick C.J., at 218-19 (C.L.R.), 768 (A.L.R.) per Windeyer J. Contra at 201-02
(C.L.R.), 756-57 (A.L.R.) per Kitto J.
18 (1974), 131 C.L.R. 203, 48 A.L.J.R. 232, at 219 (C.L.R.), 238 (A.L.J.R.) per
Barwick C.J. Contra at 247 (C.L.R.), 249-50 (A.L.J.R.) per Menzies J.
19 Supra note 12, at 368 (C.L.R.), 12 (A.L.R.) per Barwick C.J., at 378-79 (C.L.R.),
20 (A.L.R.) per McTiernan J., at 462-63 (C.L.R.), 85 (A.L.R.) per Mason J., by inference
at 505 (C.L.R.), 119 (A.L.R.) per Murphy J.
20 No. 161 of 1973.
21 Being defined by section 10 of the Act to be "any waters of the sea on the landward
side of the baseline of the territorial sea ..
22 Sections 6 and 10.
23 Section 11.
24 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, s. 51 (xxix).
25 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3.
[VOL. 17, NO. 3
Offshore Jurisdiction
it was a matter outside the classes of subjects assigned to the provinces under
section 92. Both Courts relied on Keyn as authority for the proposition that,
at common law, the realm ended at the low-water mark. Both Courts also
regarded the international law source of the jurisdiction in question as indica-
tive that such jurisdiction was beyond state or provincial powers because it
was a matter of "external affairs" 26 in the one case and a matter covered by the
expression "the Peace, Order and good Government of Canada" in the other.
27
It is not surprising that Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia was
expressly adopted by the Chief Justice in the Seas and Submerged Lands case "8
and referred to with approval by two of the other justices.2 9
However, as already indicated, the Australian decision was not marked
by the degree of unanimity about the Keyn case that is found in the Supreme
Court of Canada's opinion. The two dissenting judges30 and one of the ma-
jority3' rejected Keyn as authority for the proposition that the territory of the
realm ends at low-water mark.
Gibbs J., in dissent, was of the opinion that ownership of the sea bed of
the territorial sea was not in issue at all in Keyn. He said:
The prosecution [in Keyn] was ... in a dilemma which Cockburn C.J., who de-
livered the principal judgment for the majority, thus expressed (at 230): "To put
this shortly, to sustain this indictment the littoral sea must still be considered as
part of the high seas, and as such, under the jurisdiction of the admiral. But the
admiral never had criminal jurisdiction over foreign ships on the high seas. How,
when exercising the functions of a British judge, can he, or those acting in substitu-
tion for him, assume a jurisdiction which heretofore he did not possess, unless
authorized by statute? On the other hand, if this sea is to be considered as terri-
tory, so as to make a foreigner within it liable to the law of England, it cannot
come under the jurisdiction of the Admiralty." Thus on the view taken by the
majority, the Central Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction whether or not the sea
within the three-mile limit formed part of the territory of England .... In my
opinion it is apparent that a decision in R. v. Keyn could have been reached with-
out deciding whether the territory of England stopped at low-water mark.
3 2
Both Gibbs J. and Stephen J., also dissenting, cited the view of the Keyn
26 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 365 (C.L.R.), 10 (A.L.R.)
per Barwick C.J., at 381-82 (C.L.R.), 23 (A.L.R.) per McTiernan J., at 471-72 and 476
(C.L.R.), 92 and 96 (A.L.R.) per Mason J., at 497-98 (C.L.R.), 112-14 (A.L.R.) per
Jacobs J., at 503-04 (C.L.R.), 118 (A.L.R.) per Murphy J.
27 Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1, at 816-17 and 821 (S.C.R.), 375-
76 and 380 (D.L.R.).
28 Supra note 12, at 365 (C.L.R.), 17 (A.L.R.). The Chief Justice had approved the
decision previously in his reasons in Bonser v. LaMacchia, supra note 17, at 185 (C.L.R.),
745 (A.L.R.), where he said that the reasons given in the Canadian case were applicable
to the circumstances of the Australian colonies.
29 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, id. at 463 (C.L.R.), 85 (A.L.R.) per Mason
J., at 505 (C.L.R.), 119 (A.L.R.) per Murphy J.
30 Gibbs J. and Stephen J. See the discussion in the text accompanying note 19 ff.,
supra.
31 Jacobs J. See the further discussion in the text accompanying note 41 ff., infra.
32New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 395-96 (C.L.R.), 34
(A.L.R.). He also points out that, of those judges who formed the majority, only Cockburn
C.J. discussed the question of the Crown's ownership of the sea bed.
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case expressed in the Privy Council by Lord Shaw in Secretary of State for
India in Council v. Chelikani Rama Rao:
It should not be forgotten that that case has reference on its merits solely to the
point as to the limits of Admiralty jurisdiction; nothing else fell to be decided there.
It was marked by an extreme conflict of judicial opinion, and the judgment of the
majority of the Court was rested on the ground of there'having been no jurisdic-
tion in former times in the Admiral to try offences by foreigners on board foreign
ships, whether within or without the limit of three miles from the shore.33
As Stephen J. points out,34 this "authoritative exposition" in Chelikani of the
Keyn case is not referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offshore
Mineral Rights of British Columbia.--, For both Gibbs JA0 and Stephen J,37
there were binding decisions of the Privy Council that the British Crown was
the owner of the solum underlying the territorial sea. Given the view of Keyn
expressed in the Chelikani case, one can only join with Gibbs J. in expressing
surprise "that it should be thought that a decision as- to the jurisdiction of the
Central Criminal Court, given by the narrowest of majorities after an extreme
conflict of judicial opinion, should be treated as binding ... ."3 Furthermore,
there are other pronouncements of the Privy Council, including some uttered
in the course of disposing of appeals from Canada,o in which it is clear that
the Committee did not regard the Keyn case as having decided conclusively
that the three-mile territorial sea was not the property of the Crown. Accord-
ing to some authorities, 40 the bed of the sea came to be vested in the Crown
for some undefined distance from the shore so that accretion bringing into
existence land above the tidal level within the territorial waters was regarded
as vested in the Crown. 4' These cases were discussed in Re Offshore Mineral
Rights of British Columbia, where there was some acknowledgment of the
dicta therein to the effect that the solum of the territorial sea was vested in the
Crown, but there was no express disapproval of them, nor any comment on
how they were reconcilable with Keyn.42 Were these decisions and dicta wrong
or were the Supreme Court of Canada and the majority of the High Court of
Australia simply refusing to follow them? If the latter, why? In the determina-
33 (1916), L.R. 43 Ind. App. 192 at 199, 32 T.L.R. 652 at 653, 85 L.J.P.C. 222.
34 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 436-37 (C.L.R.), 65
(A.L.R.).
35 The Supreme Court did discuss the Chelikani case, supra note 33, but inexplicably
did not refer to the passage cited on the Keyn case. The Court gratuitously offered an
"alternative explanation," which is not persuasive, citing Oppenheim's International Last,
as its authority for that explanation. See Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1,
at 814 (S.C.R.), 373 (D.L.R.).
SO New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 402-03 (C.L.R.), 38-39
(A.L.R.).
37/d. at 417 and 436-37 (C.L.R.), 50 and 65 (A.L.R.).
38 ld. at 396 (C.L.R.), 34 (A.L.R.).
39 See, for example, A.G. B.C. v. A.G. Can., [1914] A.C. 153 at 174-75.
40 Referring to Lord Advocate v. Clyde Navigation Trustees (1891), 19 Rett. 174;
Lord Advocate v. Wemyss, [1900] A.C. 48; Fitzhardinge v. Purcell, [1908] 2 Ch. 139; and
the Chelikani case, supra note 33.
41 Bonser v. LaMacchia, supra note 17, at 187 (C.L.R.), 746 (A.L.R.).
42 Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1, at 812-14 (S.C.R.), 371-73
(D.L.R.).
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tion of an issue of such critical importance something more might reasonably
be expected than the turning of a blind eye to contrary dicta of the highest
authority.
Jacobs J., in the majority in the Seas and Submerged Lands case, ob-
viously thought so too. In his judgment, Keyn did not establish that the jurisdic-
tion of the realm ended at the low-water mark at common law. On the con-
trary, it had been stated "time and time again and must be accepted" 43 that the
seas belonged to the King, both in governorship and proprietorship. 44 The
Chelikani case had reaffirmed the dominion and proprietorship of the Crown
in the sea that it claimed. However, this dominion and proprietorship had not
been transferred to the Australian colonies, so that no part of the sea with
which the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 was concerned adhered to the
Australian States as the successors in title to those colonies. 45 Jacobs J. thus
rejected the majority view of Keyn, but he concurred with the majority con-
clusion that the Act was a valid exercise of federal legislative authority.
The similarities in the constitutional histories of the Australian and Brit-
ish North American colonies are such that the same reasoning, if valid, would
preclude provincial dominion over, and proprietorship in, any part of the sea
adjacent to Canada, leaving aside for the moment the question of jurisdiction
over the area offshore from Newfoundland. It is immediately apparent, there-
fore, that the reasoning of Jacobs J. raises the possibility of leaving the result
of Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia undisturbed, but in a way
that would permit the Supreme Court of Canada, in any future consideration
of the issue, to accept the Chelikani case, and the other authorities that are
contrary to its view of Keyn. Furthermore, His Honour's analysis is enlighten-
ing as to just what is the true nature and source of jurisdiction over offshore
areas, and it also has implications for Newfoundland's claim to jurisdiction
over the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea. It is proposed, therefore,
to examine the judgment in some further detail.
Jacobs J. began by stating that the question whether any open seas were
part of the realm of England was oversimplified and therefore misleading, for
the answer depends upon the meaning given to the word "realm":
If the word means all that which was within the allegiance of the King of England
as of his Crown of England, then the seas were within the realm. But if the word
means that place where the common law extends, then the seas are outside the
realm (Co Litt, s. 439).46
The common law had never extended to the seas. This had been shown by
Cockburn C.J. in his leading judgment among the majority in Keyn. The com-
mon law was the law that applied to all persons within England, of which it
43 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 487 (C.L.R.), 104 (A.L.R.).
44 Windeyer J., in Bonser v. LaMacchia, supra note 17, at 214 (C.L.R.), 765 (A.L.R.),
citing Hale in Ch. IV of De Jure Maris, acknowledged that this had been the case at one
time but wrote that "That claim has long since been abandoned. It had indeed been dis-
carded from the common law long before the decision in Reg. v. Keyn. .. ." He did not,
however, offer any comment on when, where, or how the claim had been so abandoned.
45 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 495 (C.L.R.), 111 (A.L.R.).
40 Id. at 485 (C.L.R.), 103 (A.L.R.).
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was the law from time immemorial. It did not apply to persons or in places
outside England unless it was made applicable by statute, and Keyn was there-
fore correct in result. But, according to Jacobs J.:
To describe it as a case concerned with the respective extents of jurisdiction of
the common law courts and the Court of Admiralty is not to diminish the im-
portance of the decision but to emphasize its essential importance in the present
context. The courts of common law had no jurisdiction because the common law
did not extend to regulate the rights and obligations of persons beyond the bound-
aries of the counties .... Whether or not the seas are described as outside the realm
depends not on the extent of the realm but on the meaning given to the word,
as I have earlier said, and in R. v. Keyn .. . the question was the meaning of that
word in the Statutes of Richard II. It was not strictly necessary to decide in R. v.
Keyn whether the Crown of England owned the sea or any part thereof below the
low-water mark and not inter fauces terrae. The important point was that the com-
mon law did not extend there.47
The Crown's rights of governorship, or dominion, and proprietorship
over the seas were not derived from the common law. They adhered to the
King as ius regale, in right of his Crown of England by virtue of his kingship
in its national rather than feudal aspect:
The royal right was a prerogative recognized by the common law, and to that ex-
tent it was part of the common law, but it did not have its source in that law. His
rights therein were not governed by the common law and the extent thereof was
not determined by that law.48
Thus, the long-established title of the Crown was a prerogative right that ad-
hered to the King because he exerted an excellence and pre-eminence over
other sovereigns, the breadth of his assertion depending on high politics and
varying with considerations of power and of expediency. The history of
changes lay not in legal but in political history.49
To summarize the views of Mr. Justice Jacobs: the court in the Keyn
decision was right in holding that the common law did not extend beyond the
low-water mark, but that holding did not mean that the Crown was thereby
denied dominion over and proprietorship in the sea that it claimed. Such
dominion and proprietorship were a Crown prerogative that had its source
elsewhere than in the common law. The common law might not extend to the
seas, but the Crown prerogative was not limited by the common law.
Gibbs J. expressed a consistent view on this point ° when he adopted the
following dictum of Diplock L.J. in Post Office v. Estuary Radio Ltd.:
It still lies within the prerogative power of the Crown to extend its sovereignty
and jurisdiction to areas of land or sea over which it has not previously claimed or
exercised sovereignty or jurisdiction. For such extension the authority of Parliament
is not required. 5 '
47 Id. at 491-92 (C.L.R.), 108 (A.L.R.).
4 8 Id. at487 (C.L.R.), 105 (A.L.R.).
49 Id. at 489 (C.L.R.), 106 (A.L.R.).
5o Id. at 388 (C.L.R.), 28 (A.L.R.).
51 [1968] 2 Q.B. 740 at 753, [1967] 3 All E.R. 663 at 680.
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Gibbs J. reaffirmed the correctness of this view in his later judgment in the
High Court of Australia in Raptis v. South Australia.52
Having rejected the majority view of Keyn, Jacobs J. then had to take a
further step to uphold the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 as a valid
exercise of Commonwealth legislative authority. It had been submitted to the
High Court of Australia that when a colony was made self-governing, or at
least when responsible government was introduced, the prerogative of the
King, manifested by his claim to the sea or a part thereof in right of his Crown
of England or of the United Kingdom, was transferred to his prerogative in
right of his Crown in the colony. However, in the view of Jacobs J.,53 the
question had been answered as long ago as 1622 by "the famous and learned
Robert Callis Esq." in his reading on the Statute of Sewers.54 Indeed, not only
does English legal theory provide no basis for the view that the seas adjoining
the Australian colonies came to be held by the Crown in right of these colonies
and not in right of the United Kingdom, "but also in practical effect such a
view is untenable." 55 Clearly, His Honour argued, the Crown in right of a
colony could not deny innocent passage, but the Imperial Crown could by
virtue of its prerogative.5 6 He concluded:
It was argued that because the prerogatives of the Crown in the colony, even those
of a proprietary nature, became vested in the Crown in right of the colony on the
grant of responsible government ... then, even though the sea and its bed be not
part of the colony, the prerogative right thereto nevertheless became vested in
the Crown in right of the colony. The argument involves an obvious non sequitur.'7
Thus, the majority view of the Keyn case was wrong, but the rights of the
Crown in the territorial sea had not devolved on the Australian colonies.
The same reasoning would seem to have equal force with respect to the
British North American colonies-with the possible exception of Newfound-
land58-that occupied the same position in relation to the Imperial Crown as
did the Australian colonies. If so, then the result in Re Offshore Mineral Rights
of British Columbia was right, although the reasoning was wrong, particularly
insofar as it relied on Keyn as authority for the proposition that the territory
and sovereignty of the Crown stopped at the low-water mark.
The Canadian Supreme Court's almost unquestioning acceptance of Keyn
as authority for this proposition is nothing short of staggering in view of the
controversy that has been the hallmark of all other discussions of the decision.
As recently as 1977, the Privy Council itself, in Pianka v. The Queen,59 noted
52 (1977), 15 A.L.R. 223 at 234; 51 A.L.J.R. 637 at 642.
53 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 492 (C.L.R.), 109 (A.L.R.).
54 1531, 23 Hen. 8, c. 5 (U.K.).
55 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 493 (C.L.R.), 109 (A.L.R.).
56 Id. at 493 (C.L.R.), 109-10 (A.L.R.).
57 id. at 494 (C.L.R.), 110 (A.L.R.).
58 See text accompanying note 96 ff., infra.
59 [19771 3 W.L.R. 859. This case, before its appeal to the Privy Council, is discussed
further in Henriques, The Jurisdiction of the Courts in Territorial Waters, [1973-75]
Jamaica L.J. 46.
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the difficulties in analysing the Keyn opinions clearly and pointed out that the
Supreme Court of Canada, in a 1931 case not even cited in Re Offshore Min-
eral Rights of British Columbia, had accepted "as a well recognized principle
that territorial waters within three miles of the shore are as clearly a part of
the state as land." 60 The refusal to confront the controversy, and even some
of its own prior dicta, leaves one with the distinct impression that nothing was
going to deter the Supreme Court from its conclusion. Viewed in this light,
the Court's opinion was really a policy choice in favour of federal jurisdiction
over offshore areas. If so, then one hopes that in any future consideration of
the question, the Court's view might be articulated as such. 61
IV. THE PROBLEM OF CANADIAN OWNERSHIP OF THE
TERRITORIAL SEA BED
There is a curious feature of the.opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada
on the territorial sea in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia that
could be explained by acceptance of Jacobs J.'s analysis in the Seas and Sub-
merged Lands case. In its formal answer to the questions posed by the Refer-
ence, the Supreme Court concluded that the sea bed and subsoil of the area
from the ordinary low-water mark seaward to the outer limits of the territorial
sea were the property of Canada, as well as being under Canada's legislative
jurisdiction.602 Yet the Court had concluded earlier in its reasons that the sea
bed could only be vested in the Crown by an act of the Legislature., 3 How
was it, then, that the sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea were held to be
not just within Canada's legislative jurisdiction but the property of Canada?04
Go ld. at 864 and 867, citing The "May" v. The King, [1931] S.C.R. 374 at 380, [1931]
3 D.L.R. 15 at 21.
11 See further the discussion of the views of Barwick C.. in New South Wales v.
Commonwealth in the text accompanying notes 104 and 105, infra. Seaton J.A., in Refer-
ence re Strait of Georgia, supra note 6, at 123, observed that, while it might have been
possible to question the decision in the Keyn case at one time, after it was approved by the
Supreme Court, that course was no longer open. That may well be so with respect to
provincial appellate courts, but it does not preclude the Supreme Court itself from re-
considering the matter, especially as Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C. was an advisory
opinion only.
6 2 Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1, at 821 (S.C.R.), 380-81 (D.L.R.).
It is interesting to note in this context that the Supreme Court was not asked the same
question with respect to the continental shelf beyond the territorial sea, but simply whether
the mineral and other natural resources of the sea bed and subsoil thereof were within the
legislative jurisdiction of Canada or British Columbia and whether Canada or British
Columbia had the right to explore and exploit those resources. Op. cit. at 821-22 (S.C.R.),
381 (D.L.R.).
63id. at 807 (S.C.R.), 366 (D.L.R.), adopting Coulson & Forbes on Waters and
Land Drainage, 6th ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1952), at 12: "In no case can the
concession [of an extension of dominion over the seas washing the shores, by international
law,] extend the realm of England so as to make the conceded portion liable to the common
law, or to vest the soil of the bed in the Crown. This must be done by the act of the
Legislature."
6A Gibbs J. in New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 408 (C.L.R.),
43 (A.L.R.), noted that "The very arguments that would deny that the sea bed was owned
by the Crown in right of the colonies, would, if accepted, mean that immediately after
federation it was not owned by the Crown in right of the Commonwealth." This observa-
tion would seem to have equal validity with respect to Canada.
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To be consistent with the Court's own reasoning, the answer could only be
that it came about as the result of some statutory provision to that effect-but
no such provision was pointed to, nor is there any such provision of which the
writer is aware. Ownership is not provided for in the Territorial Sea and Fish-
ing Zones Act65 as that Act stood at the date of the Reference nor as later
amended. 66 That Act, so far as relevant, simply defines the extent of the terri-
torial sea.67 Under Jacobs J.'s analysis, however, the sea bed and subsoil of the
territorial sea would now be the property of the Crown in right of Canada as
the successor in title to the prerogative ownership of the former Imperial
Crown.68 Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada's answer was right, but for un-
stated reasons. If this view is not accepted, then the Court's answer that the
lands in question were the property of Canada must have been wrong. They
might be made the property of Canada by legislation, but at the time of Re
Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia they had not been so dealt with,
nor have they been since.
Jacobs J.'s analysis is indeed appealing. Its acceptance would permit the
Supreme Court of Canada to abide the result in Re Offshore Mineral Rights
of British Columbia, while at the same time accepting the Privy Council au-
65 R.S.C. 1970, c. T-7.
66 R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 45. It is interesting to note in this context the provisions
of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1970 (lst Supp.), c. 2. This Act
expressly applies to "arctic waters," thus extending Canadian jurisdiction to those waters,
and "arctic Waters" are defined to include waters "the natural resources of whose subjacent
submarine areas ... Canada has the right to dispose of or exploit .. " It is doubtful that
this amounts to a declaration of ownership in Canada, but even if it did, it would still not
explain why the sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea off British Columbia are the
property of Canada because the Act by its own terms only applies north of the sixtieth
parallel of north latitude.
67 The terms of section 2 of An Act to regulate the disposition and development of oil
and gas rights, Bill C-20, 1977 (30th Parl. 3d Sess.), introduced into the House of Com-
mons on December 20th, 1977, are noteworthy in this context:
"Can ada lands" means lands that, in respect of the natural resources therein, are
under the administration, control and management of the Minister and includes
(a) 'any such lands that belong to Her Majesty in right of Canada or in respect
0f which Her Majesty in right of Canada has the right to dispose of or exploit
the minerals therein, and
(b) those submarine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada to a water depth of
two hundred metres or beyond that limit to where the depth of the superjacent
Wvaters admits the exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed and
subsoil thereof ....
No such provisions are contained in the Territorial Lands Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-6, or in
the Public Lands Grants Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-29, which are the legislative sources of
present federal regulation of offshore oil and gas exploration activity. This observation
raises the possibility that the present regulation is not validly authorized by the appropriate
statutory provisions as would seem to be implicitly recognized by the proposed section 2
of Bill C-20. Bill C-20 lapsed with the expiration of the Third Session of the Thirtieth
Parliament and had not been reintroduced at the date of writing.
68 This analysis, by the way, might also explain why the Territorial Sea and Fishing
Zones Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-7, as am. by R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 45, does not declare
ownership of the sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea to be vested in Canada, its pur-
pose being-to paraphrase Jacobs J.-to define the breadth or width from time to time
of the Crown's assertion, not to establish either ownership or jurisdiction adhering to the
Crown by virtue of its prerogative.
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thority that is contrary to the Court's view of Keyn. Furthermore, it would
clarify the apparent anomaly in the conclusion that the sea bed and subsoil
of the territorial sea were the property of Canada, as well as being within its
legislative jurisdiction.
V. THE FACT OF COLONIAL OFFSHORE JURISDICTION
However, there is a further matter to be discussed before the analysis can
be fully accepted. It is this: in fact the former British North American and
Australian colonies did exercise jurisdiction over the territorial sea adjacent to
their shores prior to formation of the respective federations. How is the actual
exercise of jurisdiction over the territorial sea to be reconciled with the view
that jurisdiction over, and ownership of, the bed of the territorial sea did not
adhere to the colonies?
This is a further unsatisfactory feature of the reasons given for the opin-
ion in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia. The Court did refer
to the dissenting judgment of Currie J. in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in
Re Dominion Coal Co. Ltd. and County of Cape Breton and quotedo0 the
headnote summary:
Prior to Confederation, Nova Scotia exercised jurisdiction over territorial waters
three miles in width measured from its coasts, bays and rivers, and under s. 109 of
the B.N.A. Act, all property rights held by Nova Scotia before Confederation were
retained. The subsoil in territorial waters belongs to the Provinces rather than to
Canada, subject to certain reservations in the B.N.A. Act.70
Clearly, the Court was aware of the fact that at least some of the colonies had
exercised jurisdiction over the adjacent territorial sea, but it offered no com-
ment.7' Granted, the exercise of jurisdiction over the territorial sea would not
necessarily of itself be conclusive of ownership of the sea bed and subsoil. In
some instances, however, the colonies, as well as exercising legislative jurisdic-
tion over the territorial sea, had also disposed of rights in the bed itself. 2
In the Seas and Submerged Lands case, it was argued before the High
Court of Australia that, because colonial legislatures legislated in respect of
the seas within the limits of the three-mile belt of territorial sea-with the ap-
69 Re Offshore Mineral Rights of D.C., supra note 1, at 803 (S.C.R.), 362-63
(D.L.R.).
70 (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 593, 48 M.P.R. 174.
71 The Court did discuss some cases involving apparent exercises of jurisdiction over
the territorial sea but saw none of them as involving any general delegation by the Imperial
Crown. See Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1, at 808 ff. (S.C.R.), 367 ff.
(D.L.R.). The Court did not, however, face the general issue being addressed here. At
the same time, it should be noted that nothing in the Court's joint opinion suggests that
there was any evidence before it of such an exercise of jurisdiction by British Columbia
prior to its entry into Confederation. Ballem, supra note 7, at 268, says that "Unlike British
Columbia, each of the Maritime provinces can cite pre-Confederation statutes whereby
jurisdiction over the territorial sea was exercised."
72 Mining leases were issued off the coast of Nova Scotia, see the dissenting judgment
of Currie J. in the Dominion Coal Case, supra note 70, at 618-19 (D.L.R.), 200-01
(M.P.R.), and off the coast of New South Wales, see the dissenting judgment of Gibbs J.
in New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 405 (C.L.R.), 41 (A.L.R.).
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proval of the law officers in their advice to the Imperial Crown and therefore
with no disallowance of the legislation-and because a colonial legislature
could not pass extra-territorial legislation, therefore the adjoining seas must
have been within the territory of the colonies. 73
Barwick C.J. of the High Court had first dealt with the argument in
Bonser v. LaMacchia, where he concluded:
Of course, the colonies were competent to make laws which operated extra-
territorially-that is to say, beyond their land margins and in and on the high
seas, not limited to the three-mile belt of the territorial sea. But this legislative
power of the colony was derived, in my opinion, from the plenary nature of the
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the territory as-
signed to the colony.74
This explanation was adopted by Jacobs J. in the Seas and Submerged Lands
case.75 The conclusion that follows from it is that the exercise of offshore juris-
diction by the colonies did not operate so as to make the territorial seas part
of the colonies. As Barwick C.J. saw it in the later case, the colonial laws,
which the opinions of the law officers of the Imperial Crown had supported,
all touched and concerned the colony and its welfare. 76 If the opinions meant
that the territorial seas were either colonial property, or were under colonial
domain, the law officers were under a basic misconception.
But, as Gibbs J. argued in dissent in the Seas and Submerged Lands
case,77 while it might be possible to regard some of this legislation as extra-
territorial, but nevertheless sufficiently connected with the colony to be within
its power, that could not truly be said of all of it:
For example, it seems to me that if the doctrine of extra-territorial incompetence
were logically applied, and unless the waters within the three-mile limit were
regarded as part of the colony, a colony would have no more right to prevent
foreigners, in a foreign boat, from fishing in the territorial sea except under licence
than it would to prevent them from hunting in a neighbouring colony. If the
territorial sea is outside the colony, how can one justify legislation regulating the
exploitation of the minerals under the sea-bed or the pearl-shell upon it?78
The inescapable conclusion was that the territorial sea adjoining the colony
was part of the territory of the Crown. Furthermore, the rights and property
of the Crown to the territorial sea and its bed were exercised on the advice of
the colonial Ministers once the colony was self-governing, and were therefore
held by the Crown in right of the colony.79
However, in the later Australian case of Pearce v. Florenca,80 Gibbs J.
73 New South Wales v. Commonwealth, id. at 495 (C.L.R.), 111 (A.L.R.) per
Jacobs J.
74 Supra note 17, at 189 (C.L.R.), 747 (A.L.R.).
7 5 Supra note 12, at 495 (C.L.R.), 111 (A.L.R.).
70 Id. at 371 (C.L.R.), 14 (A.L.R.).
77 Id. at 404 (C.L.R.), 40 (A.L.R.).
7 8 Id. at 404-05 (C.L.R.), 40-41 (A.L.R.).
79 Id. at 405 (C.L.R.), 41 (A.L.R.). Stephen J. arrived at much the same conclusion
at 441 if. (C.L.R.), 69 ff. (A.L.R.).
80 (1976), 135 C.L.R. 507, 9 A.L.R. 289.
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felt obliged to modify this opinion because of the views expressed by the ma-
jority in the Seas and Submerged Lands case that the power to make laws for
the peace, order and good government of the colony was large enough to
enable the colonial legislatures to enact legislation that applied to the offshore
waters.8' Thus, all of the colonial legislation applying to the offshore, includ-
ing that dealing with leases for mining, could be regarded as valid on the basis
that it was legislation for the peace, order and good government of the re-
spective colonies and not on the basis that it was intra-territorial because the
territory of the colonies included the territorial sea.
The issue must now be treated as authoritatively settled for Australia.
Indeed, in Robinson v. Western Australian Museum, at least two members of
the High Court of Australia have since gone so far as to uphold State legisla-
tion declaring a wreck lying on the sea bed off the coast of Western Australia
to be the property of the State as a valid law for the peace, order and good
government of the State.82
However, as already indicated,83 the issue was -not addressed as such in
Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia. The Supreme Court of Can-
ada could, therefore, face the fact that colonial legislation could apply in off-
shore areas free from any specific rejection of the view that such legislation
demonstrated that the colonies included the territorial sea as part of their terri-
tory. The Court could, in other words, choose between the views on the matter
of the majority and of the minority in the Seas and Submerged Lands case. It
should be emphasized here that Gibbs J. felt himself obliged to offer his ex-
planation in the Florenca case only because he was bound by the majority
opinion to the contrary in the Seas and Submerged Lands case-he did not in-
dicate that he was reconsidering his own earlier view because he later thought
that it was wrong. Is it really rational to explain legislation disposing of
property interests in offshore areas outside the territory of a colony on the
basis that such legislation was for the peace, order and good government of
the colony?
However, if the Supreme Court of Canada were to adopt Gibbs J.'s dis-
senting view in the Seas and Submerged Lands case, the option of adopting
Jacobs J.'s approach in that case-so as to abide the result of Re Offshore
Mineral Rights of British Columbia while at the same time acknowledging
that the Imperial Crown did have dominion and ownership in the territorial
sea-as suggested above,84 would no longer be available. The Crown preroga-
tive would be a prerogative of the Crown in right of the respective colonies
and, now, in right of the respective provinces and states, unless an effect of
federation in each country was to transfer that prerogative from the former
colonies to the respective federal units. Indeed, Barwick C.J., in the Seas and
81 He adopts, id. at 518-19 (C.L.R.), 297 (A.L.R.), the statement of Mason J. in
New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 468-69 (C.L.R.), 90 (A.L.R.).
82 (1977), 16 A.L.R. 623 at 643 per Gibbs J. and at 664 per Mason J. See further
Lumb, The Law of Wrecks in Australia: Robinson v. The Western Australian Museum
(1978), 52 Aust. L.J 198.
83 Supra note 71.
8 4 In the text following note 68, supra.
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Submerged Lands case, thought that that was the effect of federation, but his
remarks were admittedly obiter and, furthermore, were influenced by certain
policy considerations that are more appropriately discussed separately.85
Since the decision of the High Court of Australia in the Seas and Sub-
merged Lands case, that Court has considered the question of state jurisdic-
tion over offshore areas in three cases. In the first two of these-the Florenca
case s" and Raptis v. South Australia87-the Court upheld in the one, and
acknowledged in the other, that state fisheries legislation would validly apply
in offshore areas. In the third case, Robinson v. Western Australian Museum,88
as already mentioned, at least two members of the Court upheld the validity of
State legislation declaring a wreck lying on the sea bed off the coast of Western
Australia to be the property of the State. The basis for these decisions was
the fact that the Australian states continue to be able to legislate for matters
ouside the limits of their respective territories as an exercise of their power to
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the states. In order
to prevent the confusion that might otherwise arise in any consideration of
these cases in Canada, however, two fundamental differences that exist be-
tween the positions of the Canadian provinces under the provisions of The
British North America Act, on the one hand, and the Australian states under
the Australian Constitution, on the other, should be explained briefly.
The first difference arises from the limitation imposed upon the legisla-
tive powers of the provinces by the introductory words "In each Province" in
section 92 of The British North America Act. These words impose a territorial
limitation and it would seem clear that, in the event that all of the Canadian
coastal provinces were held to end territorially at the low-water mark, as has
been held with respect to the Province of British Columbia, the provinces
would thereby be precluded from legislating with regard to any matter beyond
the low-water mark. This situation would not arise in the Australian states,
which were not supplied with new state constitutions by the Australian Con-
stitution and, indeed, retained their colonial constitutions which empowered
them to make laws for the "peace, order and good government" of the several
colonies respectively and, after federation, for the several states.89 Thus, the
majority holding in the Seas and Submerged Lands case-that the territory of
the several states ended at the low-water mark-did not preclude the possible
operation of state laws in the offshore area.
Secondly, the Australian Constitution, generally speaking, assigns con-
current legislative powers to the Commonwealth Parliament, with express pro-
vision for paramountcy of Commonwealth laws over state laws in the event
85 See text accompanying notes 104-08, infra.
8 0 Supra note 80.
8 7 Supra note 52. See text accompanying note 157 ff., infra.
8s Supra note 82.
89 Gibbs J., in New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 414 (C.L.R.),
48 (A.L.R.), commented that what had been said in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British
Columbia with respect to the legislative power of the Province was clearly inapplicable
to the position of the Australian States "whose legislative powers are not limited in the
manner indicated in s. 92 of the British North America Act."
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of inconsistency.90 The Australian states, therefore, are not necessarily pre-
cluded from legislating with respect to matters in the offshore area by any
holding that those matters are within Commonwealth jurisdiction.
The Australian constitutional scheme should be distinguished from that
adopted by the British North America Act, with its division of mutually ex-
clusive powers. The legislation variously upheld in the three recent Australian
cases, therefore, could only be upheld in Canada if the territory of the prov-
inces was held to extend beyond the low-water mark.
The main point in the context of the present discussion, however, is that
the Supreme Court of Canada has not really dealt with the fact that at least
some of the former British colonies, including some of those in North America,
did exercise legislative jurisdiction over the adjacent offshore areas. How is
that fact to be reconciled with the view that such areas were outside of the
territories of the colonies? The High Court of Australia has answered that the
power of the colonies to legislate for their peace, order and good government
embraced matters in the adjacent offshore areas, but this is not an entirely con-
vincing explanation with respect to those colonial laws that dealt with prop-
erty interests in the sea bed.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S RELIANCE UPON THE IMPERIAL
TERRITORIAL WATERS JURISDICTION ACT 1878
Immediately following R. v. Keyn, the Imperial Parliament enacted the
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, 91 the purpose of which was to re-
verse the decision of the Court. In its opinion in Re Offshore Mineral Rights
of British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada asked what would have
happened if an offence had been committed within one marine league of the
coast of British Columbia in 1879.92 In answer to its own question, it said:
Had the case come up in a British Columbia Court, the applicable law would not
have been the criminal law of Canada but the law of England for the time being
in force. If the territory of British Columbia had extended one marine league from
low-water mark, the offence would have occurred in Canada and Canadian criminal
law ought to have been applicable, but by the express terms of the Territorial
Waters Jurisdiction Act it was the law of England that applied. The legislation is
inconsistent with any theory that in 1878 the Province of British Columbia pos-
sessed as part of its territory the solum of the territorial sea.93
This view of the Imperial act was a critical consideration for the Court. It was
later adopted by Windeyer J. in the High Court of Australia and applied by
him to the Australian colonies in Bonser v. LaMacchia.94
Yet it seems so obviously wrong. Stephen J. later thought so too in the
Seas and Submerged Lands case where he said:
The Supreme Court also took the view that the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction
Act 1878, because it applied the criminal law of England to the open seas within
90 Australian Constitution, section 109.
9141 & 42 Vict., c. 73 (U.K.).
9 2 Supra note 1, at 805-06 (S.C.R.), 365 (D.L.R.).
93 Id. at 805 (S.C.R.), 365 (D.L.R.).
94 Supra note 17, at 220 (C.L.R.), 769 (A.L.R.).
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the territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions, necessarily proceeded upon a
footing inconsistent with any concept that British Columbia possessed the solum
within territorial waters. This inconsistency is not, with respect, apparent to me;
the terms of the Act appear to me to cast no light upon the ownership of league
seas; it is but an instance of the effective exercise of Imperial legislative power.95
What Stephen J. is saying, and what seems to be so clearly right, is that colo-
nial jurisdiction over the territorial sea, or ownership of the bed thereof, did
not, of course, preclude the effective exercise of paramount Imperial legis-
lative jurisdiction, the reason being that the colonial legislatures were subor-
dinate to the Imperial Parliament. It follows that the applicability of the
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act to waters offshore from the colonies, and
in particular offshore from a Canadian province in 1879, is irrelevant to the
question of whether the Province of British Columbia possessed as part of its
territory the solum of the territorial sea in 1878. At that time, the Imperial
Parliament could have extended its laws to any part of the territory of any of
the Canadian provinces.
VII. SOME CONCLUSIONS
What, then, are the conclusions to be drawn from all of this? The reason-
ing of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British
Columbia, at least with respect to the territorial sea, is clearly open to chal-
lenge, particularly in its interpretation of Keyn and its avoidance of the con-
trary authority, most notably the observations of the Privy Council in Cheli-
kani. Furthermore, even if that reasoning is accepted, the conclusion of the
Supreme Court that the sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea are the prop-
erty of Canada is wrong. The Court's own reasoning would lead to the con-
clusion that the lands in question were not the property of Canada, even
though they fell within the legislative jurisdiction of Canada. They might be
made the property of Canada by an exercise of that jurisdiction, but, in the
absence of any such exercise, they are not the property of the Crown by virtue
of any of its rights. The results of the various cases, including Re Offshore
Mineral Rights of British Columbia itself, might be justified by adopting the
reasoning of Jacobs J. in the Seas and Submerged Lands case that the sea bed
and subsoil of the territorial sea were within the ownership and jurisdiction of
the Imperial Crown, but not of the Crown in right of its colonies. Support of
all of the results, however, would require rejection of the view that the colonies
had the jurisdiction that they had, in fact, exercised over the territorial sea
and its bed prior to the respective federations in Canada and Australia. On
any approach short of a rejection of the results on the territorial sea in both
Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia and the Seas and Submerged
Lands case there is a dilemma.
VIII. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR NEWFOUNDLAND'S CLAIM
So far we have been discussing the question of the territorial sea off the
former colonies, the status of the new provinces and states being that of Im-
perial colonies at the dates of the respective federations. Newfoundland was
95 Supra note 12, at 436-37 (C.L.R.), 65 (A.L.R.).
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not, however, an Imperial colony at the date of its entry into the Canadian
federation, and it is proposed now to examine the implications of the fore-
going for the status of the territorial sea off Newfoundland. 6
These implications are best understood by first discussing the situation
prior to the entry of Newfoundland into the Canadian federation as a province
in 1949. There may be some debate about the exact status of Newfoundland
at the time of its entry into Confederation, 7 but it seems clear that, for at
least some period prior to that time, it had enjoyed equal status with Canada
and Australia in what was to become the British Commonwealth of Nations. 8
If it is assumed that this means that Newfoundland was a sovereign state, then
the various views expressed in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Colum-
bia and the Seas and Submerged Lands case lead to the conclusion that, for
that period, Newfoundland had at least legislative jurisdiction over and, ac-
cording to some of the views, ownership of the sea bed and subsoil of the
territorial sea.
The two dissenting judges in the Seas and Submerged Lands casePD held
that the Crown's proprietary rights in the sea bed and subsoil of the territorial
sea become vested in the Crown in right of the Australian colonies on the
attainment of self-government. Their reasoning would seem to lead equally to
the conclusion that these rights also vested in the Crown in right of Newfound-
land on the attainment of self-government there and, presumably, continued
to be enjoyed by the Crown in right of Newfoundland after Newfoundland's
accession to nationhood during the period leading up to the Statute of West-
minster, 1931. The reasoning of Jacobs J.,100 if applied to Newfoundland,
would seem to lead to the conclusion that the rights under discussion were
enjoyed by the Imperial Crown prior to the development of independent status
for Newfoundland but, again presumably, would have devolved on the Crown
in right of Newfoundland upon the attainment of nationhood in the same way
that the rights with respect to the Australian colonies had devolved upon the
Crown in right of the Commonwealth. The views of the other majority judges
in the Seas and Submerged Lands case' 01 would imply legislative jurisdiction
for Newfoundland by the time it attained nationhood as an aspect of the new
nation's sovereignty. It would seem, however, that their reasoning would not
90 See generally Swan, The Newfoundland Offshore Claims: Interface of Constlitu-
tional Federalism and International Law, supra note 7, at 573, where the writer concludes
that Newfoundland is in a unique constitutional position due to its history and that that
history, which served to dismiss British Columbia's claim in Re Offshore Mineral Rights
of British Columbia, can only strengthen Newfoundland's claim. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the author places too much reliance in this conclusion on the validity of the
Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning and not enough on the possibility that other reasons
may just as well support the same result-other reasons that would not necessarily serve
to distinguish the position of Newfoundland.
97 See Martin, Newfoundland's Case on Offshore Minerals: A Brief Outline, supra note
5, at 38 ff.
98 See the Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4 (U.K.).
99 See text accompanying note 19 ff., supra.
'
00 See the discussion in the text accompanying note 43 ff., supra.
10 1 See the discussion in the text accompanying note 24 ff., supra.
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accord ownership of the sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea to Newfound-
land prior to its entry into Confederation because of their view that not even
the Imperial Crown had such ownership, unless Newfoundland could point to
an exercise of its legislative jurisdiction that would indicate that it had ac-
quired ownership.
The formal answers to the questions on the territorial sea posed for the
Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Colum-
bia'02 would imply both legislative jurisdiction over and ownership of the
sea bed and subsoil thereof for Newfoundland as a sovereign nation: the sit-
uations of Canada and Newfoundland as a sovereign state would seem to be
indistinguishable. However, as discussed earlier, it is not clear how the Su-
preme Court arrived at its conclusion with respect to property in the sea bed
and subsoil. The view consistent with the Court's own reasoning would seem
to be that Canada had legislative jurisdiction over the area that it might exer-
cise in order to acquire ownership. If this is correct, and the Court were moved
to reconsider its formal answer on ownership of the sea bed and subsoil, then
the implication would be that Newfoundland, as a sovereign nation, similarly
had legislative jurisdiction over the territorial sea, which it too might have
exercised so as to acquire ownership of the sea bed and subsoil thereof.
Thus, ownership of the sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea off New-
foundland during the period that it was a sovereign nation would appear to
be supported by the two minority judges and Jacobs J. in the Seas and Sub-
merged Lands case and by the formal answer of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia but, perhaps ironically,
the majority view in the Australian case and the reasoning in the Canadian
case would support only legislative jurisdiction.
Resolution of this divergence of views would seem to be necessary in
order to determine whether Newfoundland continues to have jurisdiction over
the territorial sea. If it were determined that Newfoundland in fact owned the
sea bed and subsoil of the territorial sea prior to its entry into Confederation,
then Term 37 of the Terms of Union between Newfoundland and Canada'0 3
would be conclusive in favour of Newfoundland's continued ownership.
If, on the other hand, it were determined that Newfoundland had only
legislative jurisdiction over the area, and not ownership, then Term 37
would not assist the Province's claim to continued jurisdiction, unless it
were established that its legislative jurisdiction had been exercised so as
to vest ownership in the Crown in right of Newfoundland prior to entry into
Confederation. Thus, it would seem that, in order to succeed in its claim to
ownership of and legislative jurisdiction over the sea bed and subsoil of the
territorial sea today, Newfoundland would have to establish either that it had
such ownership in accordance with the views of the minority judges and
10 2 See the discussion in the text accompanying note 62 ff., supra.
103 British North America Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 22, s. 37 (U.K.).
All lands, mines, minerals and royalties belonging to Newfoundland at the date of
Union, and all sums then due or payable for such lands, mines, minerals, or royalties,
shall belong to the Province of Newfoundland, subject to any trusts existing in
respect thereof, and to any interest other than that of the Province in the same.
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Jacobs J. in the Seas and Submerged Lands case and with the formal answer
in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, or that it had, in fact,
exercised its legislative jurisdiction so as to acquire such ownership prior to its
entry into Confederation in 1949.
It should be pointed out in this connection that Barwick C.J. in the Seas
and Submerged Lands case went so far as to say that, even if the Australian
colonies had had proprietary rights in the sea bed and subsoil of the territorial
sea, the intendment of the Australian Constitution was that such rights would
"coalesce and unite in the nation."'1 4 After pointing out that this was received
doctrine in the United States, 105 where the states originally entering the Union
had been independent nation-states and not merely colonies, he commented
further:
This result conforms, in my opinion, to an essential feature of a federation, namely
that it is the nation and not the integers of the federation which must have the
power to protect and control as a national function the area of the marginal seas,
the sea bed and airspace and continental shelf and incline.100
This is clearly a policy argument in support of the conclusion that all rights
with respect to offshore areas adhere to the central government in a federal
state and was admittedly obiter 0 - Even if valid as a general proposition, it
is difficult to see how it could override the express language of Term 37 of the
Terms of Union between Newfoundland and Canada' 08 if it were found that
Newfoundland had proprietary rights in the sea bed and subsoil of the territo-
rial sea prior to its entry into Confederation. It may, however, underscore the
argued necessity for Newfoundland to establish that it had ownership of the
sea bed and subsoil rather than simply legislative jurisdiction over the territo-
rial sea.
The foregoing discussion has concentrated on the sea bed and subsoil of
the territorial sea and has said nothing explicitly about the continental shelf
beyond the limits of the territorial sea. It would be irrational, if not illogical,
to conclude that neither the Canadian provinces nor the Australian states had
jurisdiction over the territorial sea, but did have jurisdiction over the continen-
tal shelf beyond the territorial sea. In Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British
Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada said:
As with the territorial sea, so with the continental shelf. There are two reasons why
British Columbia lacks the right to explore and exploit and lacks legislative juris-
diction:
(1) The continental shelf is outside the boundaries of British Columbia, and
(2) Canada is the sovereign State which will be recognized by international law
as having the rights stated in the Convention of 1958, and it is Canada, not
104 Supra note 12, at 373 (C.L.R.), 16 (A.L.R.). Murphy J. went so far as to say,
at 505 (C.L.R.), 119 (A.L.R.), that "Even if [the States] had become independent nations
before 1901 with the sovereign rights of an international state, on federation they would
have lost the territorial seas and other attributes of international personality."
105 Citing U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 S.Ct. 1658 (1947); U.S. v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707, 70 S.Ct. 918 (1950); U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 70 S.Ct. 914 (1950); and
U.S. v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 95 S.Ct. 1155.
10 0 Supra note 12, at 374 (C.L.R.), 16-17 (A.L.R.).
107 Id. at 371-72 (C.L.R.), 15 (A.L.R.).
108 British North America Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 22 (U.K.).
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the Province of British Columbia, that will have to answer the claims of other
members of the international community for breach of the obligations and
responsibilities imposed by the Convention. 109
Thus, a conclusion that a Canadian province does not have any jurisdiction
over the territorial sea off its shores would seem necessarily to involve a denial
of provincial jurisdiction with respect to the continental shelf. But a conclu-
sion that a province has jurisdiction over its territorial sea, presumably arising
from its ownership of the sea bed and subsoil thereof, then raises for separate
consideration the question of jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond the
territorial sea.
In the Seas and Submerged Lands case, Gibbs and Stephen JJ., having
concluded that the Australian states had proprietary rights in the sea bed and
subsoil of the territorial sea, considered separately the question of jurisdiction
over the continental shelf. Both decided without hesitation in favour of the
Commonwealth and held that the provisions of the Seas and Submerged Lands
Act 1973110 relating to the continental shelf were valid enactments of the
federal Parliament.
Stephen J. thought it clear that the Australian colonies before federation
had made no claim to ownership of or dominion over the waters of Australia's
continental shelf:
The continental shelf was at the time of federation and remained for a considerable
period afterwards res nullius, in the words of Lord Shaw in Chelikani's Case. Into
this vacuum stepped the Commonwealth .... Ill
On this view, in order to succeed in a claim to jurisdiction over the continental
shelf, a Canadian province would have to show that it had "stepped into the
vacuum" prior to Confederation and, furthermore, that Confederation had
not had the effect of divesting it of any jurisdiction so acquired. It is doubtful
that any province, other than possibly Newfoundland, could establish that it
had claimed ownership of or dominion over the continental shelf prior to
Confederation, quite apart from the question of whether any such claim could
have been validly made by a former colony.
However, Newfoundland would have been competent during its life as a
sovereign nation to have made such a claim. On the basis of Stephen J.'s view,
the question would, therefore, be whether it had in fact done so.
The same requirement of establishing a claim to the continental shelf by
Newfoundland during the period of its status as a sovereign nation would also
seem to follow from Jacobs J.'s analysis of the nature of the Crown's rights in
offshore areas. It will be recalled that he was of the view that the Crown, as
a matter of prerogative, had dominion over, and proprietorship in, the sea
"which it claimed. 11 2 The whole basis of his reasoning, however, was that
the Crown did indeed claim exclusive dominion and ownership of the seas,
1o Supra note 1, at 821 (S.C.R.), 380 (D.L.R.).
110 See the text accompanying notes 20-23, supra.
"' New South Wales v. Commonwealth, supra note 12, at 457 (C.L.R.), 81 (A.L.R.).
12 Id. at 487 (C.L.R.), 104 (A.L.R.).
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"the breadth or width of [the] assertion from time to time depending on high
politics and ... var[ying] from time to time depending on considerations of
power and of expediency.""13 On this view too Newfoundland would have to
establish that it had asserted dominion and ownership of the seas beyond the
territorial sea.
Newfoundland would, however, no doubt cite the view of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that:
[Tihe rights of the Coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that
constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist
ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an exten-
sion of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the sea
bed and exploiting its natural resources. In short there is an inherent right. 114
On this basis, it would argue that these rights adhered to Newfoundland as a
sovereign nation prior to its entry into Confederation without any express
assertion of jurisdiction over the continental shelf. Even then, however, it
would still have to show that the effect of Confederation was not the transfer
of the rights to the federal government. On this aspect of the matter, it would
again presumably rely on Term 37 of the Terms of Union, 115 but, it is sub-
mitted, with greater difficulty than in the case of the territorial sea. Term 37
speaks of "lands, mines, minerals, and royalties belonging to Newfoundland,"
and it seems clear that the rights to the continental shelf that the International
Court of Justice regarded as inherent are not rights under which the resources
in question belong to the coastal state. Rather, they are rights for the purpose
of exploring the sea bed and exploiting its natural resources which, it is sub-
mitted, are outside the language of Term 37. That they do not amount to
ownership of the resources themselves is clear from the language of the Inter-
national Court and of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. It is
significant in this context that the Supreme Court of Canada was not asked
in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia whether the resources of
the sea bed and subsoil of the continental shelf were the property of Canada
or British Columbia, but only who had legislative jurisdiction over and who
had the right to explore and exploit the resources. With respect to the terri-
torial sea, the Court had been asked both of these questions and the further
question of who had property in the sea bed and subsoil thereof.
Of all the judgments in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia
and the Seas and Submerged Lands case, only that of Jacobs J. in the latter
case suggests that the Crown in any of its rights had dominion and proprietor-
ship in the sea "which it claimed." The rights discussed by all of the otherjudges would appear to be outside the words "all lands, mines, minerals, and
royalties belonging to Newfoundland."
Quite apart from this, it is far from clear that the view of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, that rights in respect of the continental shelf exist ipso
facto and ab initio, would be accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada. The
view of Gibbs J. in the Seas and Submerged Lands case is noteworthy. Re-
113 Id. at 489 (C.L.R.), 106 (A.L.R.).
114 "1969] I.C.J. 3 at 10.
115 British North America Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 22 (U.K.).
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sponding directly to the argument of the Australian states, based on the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, that their right to the continental shelf must be
taken always to have existed, although it was never asserted, he said:
To say the rights of Coastal States in respect of the continental shelf existed from
beginning of time may or may not be correct as a matter of legal theory. In fact,
however, the rights now recognized represent the response of international law to
modern developments of science and technology, which permit the sea bed to be
exploited in a way which it was quite impossible for governments or lawyers of
earlier centuries to foresee. In this matter the arguments of history are stronger
than those of logic."6
If this view were adopted in preference to that expressed by the International
Court of Justice, Newfoundland would have to point to an acquisition juris-
diction over the continental shelf. Even if it could do so, it would still have to
establish that the effect of its entry into Confederation in 1949 was not to
transfer any such acquired jurisdiction to Canada.
IX. THE PROBLEM OF INLAND WATERS
It will be recalled that, in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Colum-
bia, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to determine jurisdiction over
areas "outside the harbours, bays, estuaries and other similar inland waters"
seaward from the ordinary low-water mark." 7 Conceptually at least, the ques-
tion of determining what areas are "inland waters" is different from that of
determining jurisdiction over areas that are outside those waters. Nevertheless,
there is a clear relationship between the two because, on the approach taken
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British
Columbia and by the High Court of Australia in the Seas and Submerged Lands
case, the answers to each depend upon the status of the various areas at com-
mon law. This relationship became clear in Re Strait of Georgia.118
The British Columbia Court of Appeal was asked by a Reference whether
or not the lands underlying the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the Strait of Georgia,
Johnstone Strait and Queen Charlotte Strait were the property of the Province.
The answer given by the Court was affirmative, by a majority of three to two.
Farris C.J.B.C., for the majority," 9 thought that the issue was resolved
quite simply by reference to the statutorily defined boundary of the Province
"to the West by the Pacific Ocean."' 20 It followed, in his analysis, that all
that lay east of the Pacific Ocean to the Rocky Mountains was part of British
Columbia. From there, it was a simple step to the further conclusion that the
lands in question belonged to the Province. Indeed, the Attorney-General of
Canada had conceded that if the lands were in British Columbia, they be-
longed to the Province.' 2 '
116 Supra note 12, at 416 (C.L.R.), 49 (A.L.R.).
117 Supra note 1, at 796 (S.C.R.), 356 (D.L.R.).
118 Supra note 6.
119 Bull and McFarlane JJ.A., concurring.
120 Act for the Union of the Colony of Vancouver Island with the Colony of British
Columbia, 1866, 29 & 30 Vict., c. 67, s. 7 (Imp.).
121 Reference re Strait of Georgia, supra note 6, at 103.
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Neither of the dissenting justices saw the issue quite so simply. Seaton
J.A. thought that the crucial question was whether the waters of the straits were
inland waters at common law.' 22 In his view, the Supreme Court of Canada's
opinion in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia had dealt with all
waters off the coast of British Columbia other than waters that were inland
waters as that term was used at common law. 123 Thus, the question now posed
for the Court had been answered by that Reference unless the waters of the
straits were inland waters at common law-that is to say, were waters inter
fauces terrae, "between the jaws of the land.' 2 4 He concluded that they
were not and that the Reference had decided the matter. Even if the Refer-
ence had not dealt with the straits in question, His Lordship argued that the
reasoning in that decision was applicable and that British Columbia did not
extend beyond the low-water mark.125 Specifically, the former colonies of Brit-
ish Columbia and Vancouver Island, later amalgamated to form British
Columbia, comprised only the land to the low-water mark within the area
embraced by the boundaries referred to in the Act for their Union and not
the whole area within those boundaries.
McIntyre J.A., in a separate dissenting opinion, adopted a similar line
of reasoning and agreed that the lands underlying the four straits were lands
that had already been held by the Supreme Court of Canada to belong to the
Queen in right of Canada.126 He further agreed that the legislative enactments
creating and fixing the boundaries of British Columbia excluded the water
from the new colony.' 27
An analysis of these dissenting opinions reveals two related matters on
which the majority and the minority disagreed. First, had the issue been
answered already by Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia? The
majority thought not and distinguished that case, whereas both dissenting
justices thought that it was directly on point. Secondly, just where is the coastal
boundary of British Columbia? The majority thought that it was the Pacific
Ocean, thus including within the province all of the area to the east of that
Ocean, whether dry land or bodies of water. The minority thought that the
province comprised only dry land above the low-water mark and waters inter
fauces terrae, which the straits in question were not.
Had, then, the question referred to the British Columbia Court of Appeal
in Re Strait of Georgia been answered by the Supreme Court's opinion in Re
Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia? The answer to this question
depends in turn on the reply to the question put to the Supreme Court of
Canada in the earlier Reference. The Supreme Court had been asked:
1. In respect of the lands, including the mineral and other natural resources, of the
sea bed and subsoil seaward from the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of
122 Id. at 113.
1231d. at 111 If.
124 The Latin phrase is 'used as intra rather than inter lauces terrae in some of tho
judgments, but Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1968) shows it
only as the latter.
125 Reference re Strait of Georgia, supra note 6, at 117 ff.
126 Id. at 128 ff.
127 Id. at 136 ff.
[VOL. 17, NO. 3
Offshore Jurisdiction
the mainland and the several islands of British Columbia, outside the harbours,
bays, estuaries and other similar inland waters, to the outer limit of the territorial
sea of Canada, as defined in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, Statutes of
Canada 1964, Chapter 22, as between Canada and British Columbia,
(a) Are the said lands the property of Canada or British Columbia?
(b) Has Canada or British Columbia the right to explore and exploit the said
lands?
(c) Has Canada or British Columbia legislative jurisdiction in relation to the said
lands?128
The Supreme Court's answer in favour of Canada was seen by Farris C.J.B.C.
as deciding simply that the territorial sea off the coast of British Columbia
belonged to Canada and never formed part of British Columbia.'2 9
The phrase "the territorial sea" as used in His Lordship's opinion must
be understood in the sense of encompassing the area seaward from the base-
lines established for the purpose of measuring the territorial sea to the distance
established by the relevant legislation. Clearly, he saw the area so described
as different from the straits designated in the present Reference, as he con-
cluded unequivocally that the "internal waters" 30 mentioned in the Order in
Council "are not part of the territorial sea.""'1 On that view of the matter, he
could conclude that Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia was not
determinative of the issue in the present case. 3 2
But was it in fact the territorial sea so understood to which the Supreme
Court had addressed itself in the earlier Reference? Seaton J.A. and McIntyre
J.A. thought not, arguing that the references to the Territorial Sea and Fishing
Zones Act in the question asked of the Supreme Court of Canada related to
the definition of the outer limit of the area only. The inner boundary of that
area was not at the baselines from which the territorial sea was measured, but
at "the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of the mainland and the several
islands of British Columbia, outside the harbours, bays, estuaries and other
similar inland waters . ... 133 In other words, the Supreme Court had deter-
mined that both the territorial sea and inland waters on the landward side of
the baselines drawn for the purposes of measuring that territorial sea were
the property of Canada. Seaton J.A. thought that, if it had been the intention
to limit the inquiry to the land covered by the statutorily defined territorial
sea, the Reference would have said: "the subsoil within the territorial sea of
Canada as defined." 134 In fact the question dealt with an area that included
the land under the statutorily defined territorial sea and also included other
land, namely, land outside the harbours, bays, estuaries and other similar in-
land waters but inside the baselines of the territorial sea.133 One must presume
128 Quoted in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1, at 796 (S.C.R.),
356 (D.L.R.).
1-29 Reference re Strait of Georgia, supra note 6, at 103.
130 Id. at 98.
'3' Id. at 103.
132 Id. at 106.
"33 Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1, at 796 (S.C.R.), 356 (D.L.R.).
134 Reference re Strait of Georgia, supra note 6, at 111.
135 Id. at 111-12.
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that the Supreme Court had answered the question asked of it, as it would be
wrong to limit the scope of a decision by applying a statutory definition to a
term used in the reasons. 136 Furthermore, the area now in question was in-
cluded in maps placed before the Supreme Court of Canada as an area claim-
ed by Canada, and it would be unreasonable to think that the Court had failed
to appreciate the significance of the exhibit.
Seaton J.A. thought that the term "harbours, bays, estuaries and other
similar inland waters" was a good description of waters that were considered
to be inland at common law. This view would seem to suggest that Re Off-
shore Mineral Rights of British Columbia had dealt with the status of all
waters off the coast of British Columbia from the low-water mark out to the
outer limit of the territorial sea, excluding only those waters that were "har-
bours, bays, estuaries and other similar inland waters" or that were, in the
words of the common law, inter fauces terrae. Thus, the status of the straits
in question had been determined by the Supreme Court of Canada unless
those straits were inter fauces terrae, which His Lordship concluded they were
not on the facts.' 37
McIntyre J.A. agreed that the definition and extent of the territorial sea
as set out in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act was only important in
defining the outer limits of the waters in question in Re Offshore Mineral
Rights of British Columbia. The Supreme Court had dealt with all lands sea-
ward from the low-water mark on the coast of the mainland and several
islands of British Columbia, with the exception of waters inter fauces terrae.18
As these Straits did not fall within that description,139 the Supreme Court had
already answered the question now posed.
It is difficult to disagree with the minority interpretation of the question
posed to the Supreme Court in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Colum-
bia. The words of the Order in Council did not ask whether the lands of "the
territorial sea" were the property of Canada or British Columbia. Clearly they
describe an area bounded on the one side by the "ordinary low-water mark on
the coast ... outside the harbours, bays, estuaries and other similar inland
waters" and bounded on the other side by "the outer limit of the territorial sea
of Canada, as defined in the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act ... ." The
reference to the territorial sea as defined in the Act is only for the purpose of
fixing the seaward limit of the area. At the same time, however, it must be
noted that some parts of the Supreme Court's opinion do suggest synonymity
between the area referred to in the Order in Council and the statutorily de-
fined territorial sea.140 Indeed, Farris C.J.B.C. thought several passages in the
opinion made it clear that the Supreme Court was dealing with rights in the
136 Id. at 112.
137 Id. at 115 ff. He notes that counsel, other than for Newfoundland, spent little time
on the "crucial" question of whether these particular waters were inland waters.
138 Id. at 130.
139 Id. at 130 and 140.
140 See, for example, Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1, at 814 and
816 (S.C.R.), 373 and 375 (D.L.R.). This apparent confusion adds further significance
to the remarks in the text accompanying note 157 ff., infra.
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territorial sea.' 4 ' The Court did refer repeatedly to the territorial sea, but it
is unclear whether the references were to the territorial sea as defined by statute
or, as Seaton J.A. thought, as a description of the waters set out in the ques-
tion. In his opinion, "the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of the main-
land and the several islands of British Columbia outside the harbours, bays,
estuaries and other similar inland waters" used to be the inner limit of the
territorial sea. It would be reasonable, therefore, to think that the Supreme
Court had used the term "the territorial sea" to describe the waters set out in
the question put to it. That would be an accurate use of the term and there
was no other convenient description for the waters. 42
The discussion of this issue as to just what was decided by Re Offshore
Mineral Rights of British Columbia may seem to have been somewhat la-
boured. If that is so, however, it is because the implications for the resolution
of whether the federal Parliament or the provincial Legislatures have juris-
diction in numerous areas around the coastline are very great indeed. If the
Supreme Court should uphold the minority view, then only those areas that
are within harbours, bays, estuaries and other similar inland waters-which
are inter fauces terrae at common law-will be within provincial jurisdiction,
except where a province might be able to establish an express extension of its
boundaries to include areas seaward of those waters.
Whatever the sense in which the Supreme Court used the term "the terri-
torial sea" in its opinion, the view seems compelling that the Order in Council
referred to more waters than just those embraced by the statutorily defined
territorial sea, and it was, after all, the question posed by the Order in Coun-
cil that the Court answered in favour of Canada. But even if Farris C.J.B.C.
is right and the Court must be seen as having dealt only with the statutorily
defined territorial sea, that still leaves to be answered the question of owner-
ship of the lands underlying the four straits designated in the British Columbia
Order in Council. If Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia had
included these waters, that would be determinative that the underlying lands
were the property of Canada, but a finding that they had not been included
would not be determinative that they were the property of British Columbia.
However, before turning to an examination of this issue, there is a further
matter requiring comment relating to the majority view in Re Strait of Georgia
that the Supreme Court had dealt with the statutorily defined territorial sea.
As the majority saw it, the Supreme Court Reference had dealt with the terri-
torial sea in the sense of the area seaward from the baselines drawn for the
purpose of measuring that sea. These would be the lines provided for in sec-
tion 5 of the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act 43 that, in accordance with
141 Reference re Strait of Georgia, supra note 6, at 106.
142 Id. at 111-12. For the sake of clarity, it should be emphasized here that the term
"the territorial sea" used in this way would embrace both the territorial sea, as the area
between the baselines established for the purpose of measuring that sea and the outer limit
of that sea, and waters to the landward side of those baselines but outside the harbours,
bays, estuaries and other similar inland waters. See the further discussion in the text
accompanying note 161 ff., infra.
143 R.S.C. 1970, c. T-7.
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the majority view, establish the inner limit of the area determined by the
Supreme Court to be the property of Canada. However, the outer limit of the
area with which the Court was concerned in Re Strait of Georgia was bounded,
by the terms of the Order in Council, "on the west by a line from Tatoosh
Island lighthouse to Bonilla Point reference mark and on the north by a
straight line drawn across Queen Charlotte Strait from Greeting Point on Nigei
Island to McEwan Point on Branham Island .... -144 If the lines so prescribed
correspond exactly with the baselines drawn for measuring the territorial sea,
no difficulty would arise. If, however, they should not correspond precisely,
then either part of the area described in the British Columbia Order in Council
must have included part of the territorial sea outside the baselines, or the area
described did not include all of the area out to the baselines. The interesting
possibility thus arises that the majority opinion, by answering that British Co-
lumbia owns the lands described, has transferred part of Canada's territorial
sea to the Province or, alternatively, has left undecided the ownership of a
strip between the baselines and the lines described in the Order in Council.
The majority did not consider at all the question of whether the baselines for
the territorial sea coincided with the lines prescribed by the Order in Council.
Having determined that Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia
had not dealt with the lands described in the Order in Council, Farris C.J.B.C.
had to consider the ownership of those lands independently of that authority.
One says "independently" but in fact it seems that His Lordship saw the issue
in essentially the same way as the Supreme Court had seen the issue in the
earlier case. The question to which both courts seem to have addressed them-
selves is: Are the lands in issue within the Province?
As indicated, the majority had no difficulty in answering that they were,
because the boundaries of the Province were statutorily defined "to the West
by the Pacific Ocean.' 15 The Province included all that lay within the boun-
daries so defined. However, the matter is not quite so simple, as there is some
authority for the proposition that the term "territory" means the land mass
only and does not include any areas of the sea.
In the Seas and Submerged Lands case in the High Court of Australia,
Mason J. concluded that the specific inclusion of "islands" in the Letters Pa-
tent describing some of the Australian colonies was inconsistent with the no-
tion that the colonies included any portion of the sea. This confirmed that the
colonies were limited to the land mass and islands.146 Jacobs J. was more ex-
plicit and stated that the primary meaning of "territory" was land, and that
this primary meaning would have to be displaced by the wording of the parti-
cular descriptions of the colonies which, in the case of the Australian colonies,
had not been done. 147
Applying these two views to the case of British Columbia in Re Strait of
144 Supra note 6, at 98.
145 Text accompanying note 120, supra.
140 Supra note 12, at 458-61 (C.L.R.), 82-84 (A.L.R.).
147 Id. at 480-85 (C.L.R.), 99-103 (A.L.R.). South Australia is an exception. See
the text accompanying note 159, infra.
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Georgia, Farris C.J.B.C. concluded that any presumption that "territory"
means land only was rebutted by the language used to define the western
boundary of the colony. He said:
If "territories" meant land alone, the western boundary of British Columbia could
not possibly be the Pacific Ocean, but would have to be the Gulf of Georgia. This
flies in the face of the clear terms of the statute, which specified the Pacific Ocean
as the western boundary. 148
Thus, whether as a simple matter of interpretation or as a matter of rebutting a
presumption, in Farris C.J.B.C.'s judgment, the description of the boundaries
of British Columbia did include within the former colony the waters of the
straits in question.
Seaton and McIntyre JJ.A., however, disagreed. In Seaton J.A.'s view,
reference to the Pacific Ocean and the territories of the United States of
America in the description of the boundaries of British Columbia did not im-
ply that everything up to that line was to be within the new colony and that
that line constituted the boundary of the colony any more than would a grant
of "all My territories in the Pacific Ocean" necessarily include the sea bed of
the whole Pacific Ocean. He added:
For the province I think the most that can be said is that the language is capable
of beariig that meaning. But it is at least equally capable of bearing a different
meaning, namely, that it was granting the land alone. I think it is more likely that
the latter meaning is the appropriate one.149
Similarly, McIntyre J.A. concluded that "in the ordinary sense of the word
and as it has been used historically, 'territory' refers to land and not to
water."150 For him it was clear that in the statutes under review its meaning
was limited to land, although the word could be used in a context that would
accord to it a broader meaning.
These views were clearly obiter in view of the fact that both Seaton and
McIntyre JJ.A. had already disposed of the issue before them by concluding
that Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia had determined the
answer to the question before them in the instant case. 51 Nevertheless, they
point to a clear divergence of opinion on the issue of whether the use of the
word "territory" in the description of the boundaries of former colonies limits
the colonies to the land masses within the boundaries.
The issue, it is submitted, is really one of interpretation. Even if the
primary meaning of "territory" is land, there is still a question of whether
that meaning has been displaced in particular cases. The question then be-
comes: what sort of wording is sufficient to displace that primary meaning?
Will the mere reference to a boundary beyond the low-water mark be suffi-
cient or must there be something more?
Interestingly, the question may have been answered inferentially by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia
14 8 Supra note 6, at 109.
149 Id. at 121.
15, Id. at 136.
151 Text accompanying notes 137-39, supra.
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in commenting upon, and distinguishing, the New Brunswick case of R. v.
Burt.15 2 In that case, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
Brunswick had held that the seizure of a ship carrying a cargo of intoxicating
liquor approximately one and three-quarter miles from the shore off Chance
Harbour in the County of Saint John had occurred within the Province of
New Brunswick. The decision was based upon the fact that:
By the Royal Instructions issued to Governor Carlton upon the separation of what
is now the Province of New Brunswick from the Province of Nova Scotia, the
southern boundary of the new Province was defined as "a line in the centre of the
Bay of Fundy from the River Saint Croix aforesaid to the mouth of the Musquat
(Missiquash) River" clearly indicating the claim of Great Britain at the time to
the whole of the Bay of Fundy as a portion of her territory.15 3
In distinguishing this case, the Supreme Court of Canada said that the place
of seizure was within the Province of New Brunswick.154 The Supreme Court
thus seemed to be accepting that the definition of the boundary of New Bruns-
wick as "a line in the centre of the Bay of Fundy" was sufficient to extend the
territory of the Province to that line.
In the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Raptis v. South
Australia,15 it was held that the inclusion of the phrase "all and every the
Bays and Gulfs thereof" in the Letters Patent fixing the boundaries of South
Australia was sufficient to include within the State's territorial boundaries
"waters which would not otherwise form a part of the State."' "
Two related questions then emerge from Re Strait of Georgia. First, was
the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Co-
lumbia concerned only with the territorial sea as defined by statute or was it
concerned with all waters outside waters inter fauces terrae to the outer limit
of the territorial sea? Secondly, is the mere reference to a line beyond the low-
water mark sufficient to extend the boundary of a province to that line so as
to include the whole area on the landward side of the line within the territory
of the province, or is there a presumption that only land within the area forms
its territory-a presumption that would need to be rebutted by clear language
indicating that areas covered by water were also part of the province? This
second question is important for the resolution of the status not only of the
straits under consideration in Re Strait of Georgia, but also of the Bay of
Fundy between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. It will also have a bearing
on what significance the Supreme Court might attach to the fact that the des-
cription of the boundaries of at least some of the British North American
colonies included the phrase "with all the rights, members and appurtenances,
whatsoever, thereto belonging.' 57
152 (1932-33), 5 M.P.R. 112.
153 Id. at 117.
154 Re Offshore Mineral Rights of B.C., supra note 1, at 809 (S.C.R.), 368-69
(D.L.R.).
155 Supra note 52.
156 Id. at 240 per Stephen J., Barwick C.J. agreeing, id. at 229. See also id. at 259 per
Jacobs J.
157 See further Houston, Documents Illustrative of the Canadian Constitution (To-
ronto: Carswell, 1891).
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X. THE CONFUSED INTERFACE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A reading of the several cases under discussion here quickly reveals that
there is not simply one offshore area comprising everything seaward from the
low-water mark but, rather, that there are several distinct bodies of water, the
status of which varies for jurisdictional purposes, both in the domestic con-
stitutional context in a federal system and in the international context. It is
submitted that a great deal of confusion in those cases arises from a failure to
make these distinctions, first between the several bodies of water and, second-
ly, between domestic constitutional law questions and international law ques-
tions. Seaton J.A. noted this second failing in Re Strait of Georgia when he
observed:
A number of the province's arguments shifted from sovereignty and international
law to proprietorship and common law without recognition of the step.158
However, before addressing the specific question of the relationship of inter-
national law to the question of domestic constitutional jurisdiction, the several
bodies of water should be identified.
In Raptis v. South Australia, the key question for the High Court of
Australia was whether the waters of Spencer Gulf and Gulf St. Vincent were
within the boundaries of the State and, if so, where the seaward boundaries of
the two Gulfs were located. Gibbs J. said:
In the present case the bays and gulfs were included in the territory of the Province
[of South Australia] by the express provisions of the Letters Patent, which were
themselves expressly authorized by 4 & 5 Will. IV, c. 95. There is nothing in the
statute or in the Letters Patent to afford any support for the view that the words
"the Bays and Gulfs thereof" are to be given a restricted meaning, so that they
refer only to bays and gulfs that would have been treated as part of the territory
by the rules of common law or of international law.159
Earlier in Bonser v. LaMacchia, Windeyer J. had said that Spencer Gulf and
Gulf St. Vincent were within South Australia. His phrasing is significant:
It is worth noticing too that the Province of South Australia included 'all and
every the islands adjacent thereto and the bays and gulfs thereof': 4 & 5 Wm. IV,
c. 95. Spencer Gulf and St. Vincent's Gulf are therefore to be deemed to be inter
fauces terrae. 0o (Emphasis added).
It is submitted that the waters of the Gulfs are of the same status as waters
inter fauces terrae in the sense that they form part of the territory of South
Australia, but that is because of the effect of the Letters Patent and not be-
cause they are waters inter fauces terrae at common law. There is, therefore,
a conceptual distinction between waters inter fauces terrae at common law and
waters beyond those waters that nevertheless form part of a province's or
state's territory because its boundaries have been extended in such a way as
to include those latter waters within the territory of the province or state.
158 Supra note 6, at 113.
159 Supra note 52, at 234. The Raptis case is analysed by O'Connell in Bays, Historic
Waters and the Implications of A. Raptis & Son v. South Australia (1978), 52 Aust. L.J. 64.
160 Supra note 17, at 233 (C.L.R.), 778 (A.L.R.).
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The several bodies of water may, then, be identified as follows.'"' First
are waters inter fauces terrae. There has always been difficulty in determining
when particular bodies of water are within the jaws of the land. Hill J. put the
problem rather picturesquely in The Fagernes when he said: "What is the
metaphor, the open mouth of a man or of a crocodile?"'1 2 Notwithstanding
the difficulty of application, it is clear that all such waters are within the body
of the realm and, therefore, are part of the territory of the Canadian prov-
inces and the Australian states.
Next, as clearly established by the Raptis case and, by implication by the
Supreme Court of Canada's distinguishing of the Burt case', 3-- and, indeed, as
was clear from the majority opinion in the Keyn case itself-there may be
bodies of water enclosed within the boundaries of the states and provinces
by express provision and which would not be part of the territory as waters
inter fauces terrae. In other words, seaward from the closing lines employed
to delineate waters inter fauces terrae, there may be other bodies of water
within the territory of the provinces or states that it is convenient to think of
as bounded on the landward side by either the low-water mark or the closing
lines employed to delineate waters inter fauces terrae, as the case may re-
quire, and bounded on the seaward side by the line to which the boundaries
had been extended. If we accept the validity of Re Offshore Mineral Rights
of British Columbia and the majority judgments in the Seas and Submerged
Lands case, these areas would form part of the province or state and would,
therefore, be owned by the province or state and be within their legislative
jurisdiction. All areas except for these and waters inter fauces terrae would be
under federal jurisdiction.
Third, there may be waters to the landward side of the baselines em-
ployed for the purpose of measuring the nation's territorial sea as permitted
under the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1958. Such baselines might
conceivably be to either the landward or the seaward side of the outer limits
of any waters falling within the territory of a province or a state by virtue of an
express extension of its boundaries, as discussed in the previous paragraph. It
is extremely unlikely-one might almost say not possible-that such baselines
would ever be to the landward side of the closing lines employed to delineate
waters inter fauces terrae.
Fourth, there is the territorial sea itself, which could describe several
bodies of water and have different seaward boundaries, depending upon which
body was being described. In its widest sense, it would describe all of that
body of water seaward from the low-water mark or closing lines of waters inter
fauces terrae to the outer limits of the territorial sea claimed. In a narrower
sense, it would describe that body of water seaward from the same mark or
lines to what is referred to as the Imperial territorial sea, appropriately de-
161 See generally Dowrick, Submarine Areas around Great Britain, [1977] Public
Law 10.
162 [1926] P. 185 at 189.
163 See the text accompanying note 152 ff., supra.
[VOL. 17, NO. 3
Offshore Jurisdiction
scribed in some of the cases under discussion as the "league seas." In yet an-
other sense, it might mean that body of water seaward from the baselines
drawn by the country concerned for the purposes of measuring its territorial
sea to the outer limit of the territorial sea claimed.
Fifth, there is the area beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, which
area, of course, embraces the continental shelf.
The importance of the distinction between domestic constitutional law
questions and international law questions becomes immediately apparent from
this catalogue of the several bodies of water. There is significance in distin-
guishing between some of those bodies only in the context of domestic consti-
tutional law. International law is not at all concerned with whether waters are
inter fauces terrae or are waters on the landward side of baselines employed
for the purposes of measuring the territorial sea. Both, as far as the interna-
tional community is concerned, are the nation's internal waters,'164 but the re-
cognition of them as internal waters by other nations has no bearing on their
status under the constitution of the particular nation to which they are adja-
cent. It may well be argued that the whole question would be so much simpler
if they were not kept separate but were coalesced so that base and closing
lines for international law purposes were also used for the resolution of ques-
tions between Commonwealth and States, Canada and Provinces.
Murphy J. in Raptis, in the High Court of Australia, obviously thought
so, too:
The territorial limits dividing the internal waters from the territorial sea should be
determined in accordance with the prevailing rules of international law which are
an important part of the world order.
... The presumption is that, in the Letters Patent of 1836, the United Kingdom
Government claimed only the internal waters that the prevailing rules of inter-
national law attached to the land claimed. Although these rules were uncertain
then, they have now been clarified.
The rules for ascertaining territorial limits are set out in the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (The Geneva Convention of 1958) ... 165
His conclusion on the facts of that case leaves no room for doubt that he equat-
ed the base closing lines that would, in his view, be proper under the Conven-
tion for purposes of measuring the territorial sea with the boundary of South
Australia. It is submitted, however, that these views, desirable as the practical
implications may be, are simply inconsistent with the rulings in Re Offshore
Mineral Rights of British Columbia and the Seas and Submerged Lands case
that British Columbia and the Australian States are respectively bounded by
164 That is assuming that the baselines have been fixed in compliance with the inter-
national law rules for such baselines.
16 5 Supra note 52, at 262-63. The U.S. Supreme Court arrived at this position in U.S.
v. State of La. (the Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11, 89 S. Ct. 773 (1969), where
it held that that part of Louisiana's coastline which, under the U.S. Submerged Lands Act,
§ 2(c), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301(c), consists of the "line marking seaward limit of inland
waters" is to be drawn in accordance with the definitions of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. However, the decision was based on interpretation
of the Submerged Lands Act.
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the low-water mark. 16 Those rulings necessarily recognize that there will be
waters beyond the low-water mark but inside the baselines established for the
purpose of measuring the nation's territorial sea. They therefore also mean
that the dividing line for domestic constitutional purposes may be different
from the dividing line for international law purposes between the nation's ter-
ritory and its offshore waters.
Barwick C.J. was clearly right when he said in Raptis:
But the instant question is not to be decided, in my opinion by any considerations
of international law or by the opinion of courts, tribunals or writers in that area. 107
Similarly, in Re Strait of Georgia, Seaton J.A. cautioned:
In my view, except insofar as international law has influenced domestic law, the
law of nations does not concern us. I assume that these were British waters, that
they are now Canadian waters and that they are now inland or internal waters in
an international law sense. But that does not advance British Columbia's position
because ours is not an international law question.'0 8
It is clear that the Supreme Court of Canada was not mindful of the dis-
tinction in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, where it con-
cluded that British Columbia had no jurisdiction over offshore areas because
those areas were outside the province and because the rights in issue arise
by international law.' 69 Professor Ivan Head has described the Court's state-
ments in this part of its opinion as "shocking in their impact" and "inexpli-
cable," save on the basis that "the Court was not cognizant of what it was
saying.' u70
The argument seems to be that the rights with which the courts are con-
cerned derive from international law, that they are dependent upon the inter-
national community for recognition and, therefore, are matters "not coming
within the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the provinces" or are
"external affairs." But, in the context of a domestic constitutional law question,
how do these rights derive from or depend upon international law any more
than does the recognition of the nation itself?' 7' The argument misses the
point: within a federal system, where go these rights rather than whence came
they?
166 Except where expressly extended beyond that mark.
107 Supra note 52, at 228.
168 Supra note 6, at 113. Even if one accepts the view recently expressed by Denning
M.R. in Trendtex Trading v. Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 at 554 (C.A.), that the
rules of international law form part of domestic law, the point being made here still stands
because the rules of international law are not concerned with the question of whether
rights in a federal system reside with the central or the regional governments and
legislatures.
169 Supra note 1,- at 816-17 and 821 (S.C.R.), and 375-76 and 380 (D.L.R.).
170 Head, supra note 7, at 147, 151, 155, as quoted in Morris, "Canadian Federalism
and International Law," in Macdonald et al., ed., Canadian Perspectives oil International
Law and Organization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) at 55 and 60 ff.
171 Lowe, International Law and Federal Offshore Lands Disputes (1977), 1 Marine
Policy 311 at 313, seems to be making the same point when he says that "Canada is no
more nor less responsible for offshore activities than it is for onshore activities which
undoubtedly fall under provincial jurisdiction."
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XI. CONCLUSIONS
A re-examination of the reasons for the Supreme Court of Canada's opin-
ion in Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, in the light of the
reasons for judgment in the series of recent Australian cases on jurisdiction
over offshore areas, raises a number of serious doubts about the validity of
those reasons and points to several perplexing questions:
(1) Why did the Supreme Court ignore the Privy Council's rejection in
the Chelikani case of the view that the Keyn case had established that the ter-
ritory of the realm ended at the low-water mark?
(2) On what basis did the Court answer that the sea bed and subsoil of
the territorial sea off British Columbia were the property of Canada when its
own reasons would seem to compel the conclusion that ownership in offshore
areas could only be acquired by express legislative enactment?
(3) How is the denial of colonial jurisdiction over the territorial sea to
be reconciled with the fact that the colonies actually exercised jurisdiction in
the area, in some cases by disposing of property interests in the bed thereof?
(4) Why is the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 inconsistent
with any theory that British Columbia possessed as part of its territory the
solum of the territorial sea before its entry into the Canadian federation?
(5) What is the inner boundary of the waters that were held by the
Supreme Court to be beyond provincial jurisdiction? Is it at the baselines used
for purposes of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea or is it the same as
the boundary of waters inter fauces terrae?
(6) What is the relevance to a domestic constitutional law question, de-
fining federal or provincial jurisdiction, of the recognition accorded to the
nation's claims by international law?
The answers to these questions will not necessarily lead to a reversal of
the Court's answers to the questions that it was asked with respect to British
Columbia, nor to a different answer for any other province. One hopes, how-
ever, that those answers will recognize the profound significance of the ques-
tions for any convincing resolution of what is-in view of the stakes involved
as the search for natural resources moves more and more rapidly seaward into
the last frontier on this planet-one of the most important constitutional
matters that the Court has had to resolve.
The fact that some of the questions were overlooked or even avoided by
the Supreme Court tempts the conclusion that the Court was really moved to
find so unequivocally in favour of Canada by policy considerations. If that
is so, then the Court's opinion does not bode well for claims to jurisdiction
over offshore areas by any other province.
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